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Reginald Pecock on the Authority of
Reason, Scripture and Tradition
by STEPHEN E. LAHEY
Bishop Reginald Pecock (c. 1390–1461) is remembered for vernacular works formulated to combat
Lollardy using reason, not the force of ecclesiastical authority. He argued that Scripture’s teachings are true
not because they are in Scripture, but because they are evident to unassisted reason. While scholars have
explored his arguments in ecclesiastical and historical context, little analysis exists of the scholastic
background to Pecock’s conception of the relation of reason to faith. This article suggests that Pecock’s
arguments are grounded in the thought of Aquinas and Scotus, and illustrates how his understanding of
reason’s capabilities directs his conception of the authority of Scripture and church tradition.
W hen Bishop Reginald Pecock was condemned for heretical beliefsand given the choice of recantation or the stake, his long-timeopponent Thomas Gascoigne sneered that God’s justice ensures
that the fool who shoots his arrows at the sun must inevitably have them fall
upon his own head.1 Pecock’s folly had been to suggest that reason alone
could convince errant believers like the Lollards that they should abandon
their heresy and live a morally pure Christian life, because he believed that
most of what Scripture teaches is true not because it appears in holy writ, but
because it is evident to the ‘doom of resoun’, or the ‘moral lawe of kinde’.2
To show this, Pecock had devised a moral system in the vernacular,
unencumbered with complexities of scriptural and doctrinal interpretation,
designed to show the coherence of human reason and the moral Christian
life. Ecclesiastical and royal authority need not enter into a matter in which
unaided reason was sufficient. That the laity should be encouraged to
abandon ecclesiastical authority and rely on reason supplemented with some
elements of faith was bad enough, but that a bishop should be suggesting this
was too much for the Lancastrian Church. During formal examination at
1 ‘Fatuus est enim homo qui sagittat ut destruat solem’ : Thomas Gascoigne, Loci e libro
veritatum, ed. Thorold Rogers, Oxford 1881, 217.
2 ‘ [B]ut so it is, that al the leernyng and knowing, which Holi Scripture zeueth vpon eny
bifore seid gouernaunce, deede, or trouthe of Goddis moral lawe, mai be had bi doom of
natural resoun’ : Repressor i.3, pp. 12–13.
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Lambeth, on 21 November 1457, and again in a public appearance at St
Paul’s Cross on 4 December, Pecock chose recantation over the stake :
I am in a strait betwixt the two, and hesitate in despair as to what I shall choose. If I
defend my opinions and positions, I must be burned to death: if I do not, I shall be a
byword and a reproach. Yet it is better to incur the taunts of the people, than to
forsake the law of faith … I choose, therefore, to make an abjuration.3
Gascoigne attributed Pecock’s perverse ‘betrayal ’ of his ecclesiastical auth-
ority to presumptuous arrogance surpassing all prudence.4 In this century,
scholars have been less willing to dismiss Pecock’s belief in the authority of
reason as based in moral deficiency. As scholarship has developed over the
past decades, it has replaced the ad hominem explanation typified by
Gascoigne with a more balanced account, taking into consideration the poli-
tics in which Pecock was involved, the characteristics of vernacular discourse
condemned as heretical and the changing approaches of secular and sacred
authority to how the laity understood justice.5 Pecock’s academic affiliation
with Oxford is another means by which to understand the bishop’s appar-
ently counterintuitive approach to instructing the laity. He left Wales and
began his studies at Oriel College in 1409 or 1410, probably received his MA in
1416 and his BTH by 1424. He was made Master of Whittington College in
1431, and upon being named bishop of St Asaph in 1444 was granted his
doctorate of divinity. Six years later he left Wales for good, to become bishop
of Chichester, where his thought would evoke the ire of the English
ecclesiastical establishment. While calling Pecock an academic would be
overstatement, given that much of his career was devoted to pastoral duties,
we should remember that his intellect developed in a scholastic atmosphere if
we are to understand why he holds reason to be more authoritative than
ecclesiastical office.
Twentieth-century opinion about the nature of Pecock’s thought varies.
Roy Martin Haines characterises Pecock as a tolerant man in an age of
3 Quoted in Churchill Babington’s introduction to The repressor, i (Rolls Series, 1860), 46.
4 See R. M. Ball, ‘The opponents of Bishop Pecock’, this JOURNAL xlviii (1997), 230–62.
5 The most complete recent biographical treatment is Wendy Scase, Reginald Pecock,
Aldershot 1996, 1–146. See also Charles Brockwell, Bishop Reginald Pecock and the Lancastrian
Church, Lewiston 1985. For Lollardy and Pecock’s unique approach to the heresy see Anne
Hudson, The premature Reformation, Oxford 1988, 189–91; G. Nuttall, ‘Bishop Pecock and the
Lollard movement ’, Transactions of the Congregational Historical Society xiii (1937–9), 82–6; J. Fines,
‘Bishop Reginald Pecock and the Lollards ’, in M. J. Kitch (ed.), Studies in Sussex church history,
London 1981, 57–75; and Margaret Aston, Lollards and reformers, London 1984. For Pecock’s
place in evolving institutional attitudes towards lay understanding of justice see James H.
Landman, ‘The doom of resoun: accomodating lay interpretation in late medieval England’,
in Barbara Hanawalt and David Wallace (eds), Medieval crime and social control, Minneapolis
1999, 90–123, and Charles Brockwell, ‘Answering the known men: Bishop Reginald Pecock
and Mr Richard Hooker ’, Church History xlix (1980), 133–46.
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intolerance, comparing him favourably to Locke in this regard. Everett
Emerson called him a ‘Christian rationalist ’ analogous to Hooker in his
attempt to strike a balance between zealous, sola scriptura purists and the
traditionalism of an inflexible ecclesiastical orthodoxy.6 On the other hand,
Pecock’s editors Elsie Hitchcock, Churchill Babington and William Greet
emphasise the Aristotelian elements in his theory of inference and his moral
theory, comparing him to Aquinas and Scotus.7 E. F. Jacob noted in 1968 the
need for further study of Pecock’s philosophy, but fuller treatments of the
content of his work are few, and none do more than glance at his philosophy.
V. H. H. Green proceeds from some groundbreaking biographical work to a
general account of the anti-Lollard scheme of what remains of Pecock’s
works. Charles Brockwell places the bishop’s work in its ecclesiastical context
and begins assessment of his theologicalmethodology by comparing the power
of the ‘doom of resoun’ to scriptural and fideistic authority. Brockwell’s
account is fuller, but does not explain why Pecock felt that human reason has
such authority. Joseph Patrouch’s monograph provides a broader account of
the complexities of Pecock’s moral system: the four necessities for a good
life – knowledge, love, goodworks and grace – the sevenmatters of knowledge
and the four tables of law, but it, too, does not say why Pecock felt that our
reason was sufficiently authoritative to do without the record of God’s
commands in Scripture. More recent treatments of Pecock, notably that of
Wendy Scase, have provided particularly full and useful accounts of his
biography, but say little about why he believed what he did.8
We will make little sense of Pecock’s opinion of ecclesiastical authority, or
of his remarkable moral theory, without understanding what led him to
believe that the ‘doom of resoun’ has such authority as to supplant Scripture
from its pride of place in the Christian world view. The focus of this article
6 R. M. Haines, ‘Reginald Pecock: a tolerant man in an age of intolerance’, in W. J. Sheils
(ed.), Persecution and toleration (Studies in Church History xxi, 1984), 125–37 ; Everett H. Emerson,
‘Reginald Pecock: Christian rationalist ’, Speculum xxxi (1956), 235–42.
7 Reginald Pecock, Reule of Chrysten religioun, ed. William Greets (Early English Text Society
[hereinafter cited as EETS] clxxi, 1927, repr. 1987). Greets suggests that Pecock’s approach is
more Scotistic than anything else, and that he substitutes reason for the place of will in the
Scotistic Aristotelian synthesis. This article is not intended to prove Greets’s thesis, but only to
clarify what Pecock meant by the ‘doom of resoun’, the better to begin exploring that thesis.
See also The Donet, ed. Elsie Vaughn Hitchcock (EETS o.s. clvi, 1921, repr. 1996) ; The folower to
the Donet, ed. Elsie Vaughn Hitchcock (EETS o.s. clxiv, 1924, repr. 1981; The repressor of over much
blaming of the clergy, ed. Churchill Babington (Rolls Series, 1860) ; Reginald Pecock’s Book of feith, ed.
J. L. Morison, Glasgow 1909.
8 E. F. Jacob, ‘Reynold Pecock, bishop of Chichester ’, in his Essays in later medieval history,
Manchester 1968, 1–38; V. H. H. Green, Bishop Reginald Pecock : a study in ecclesiastical history and
thought, Cambridge 1945; Brockwell, Pecock and the Lancastrian Church, and ‘The historical career
of Bishop Reginald Pecock, DD: the Poore scoleris myrrour or a case study in famous obscurity ’,
Harvard Theological Review lxxiv (1981), 177–207; Joseph Patrouch, Reginald Pecock, New York
1970.
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will be on what Pecock believes the ‘doom of resoun’ to be, what is its
province and why he believes this. While others have emphasised the
elements of his philosophy that departed from non-academic ecclesiastical
orthodoxy, I believe that it exemplifies the ‘Aristotelian eclecticism’ common
in post-Wyclif Oxford, suggesting Pecock’s hope of evoking the relative
serenity of thirteenth-century Aristotelian synthesis in an age of moderni
scepticism and anti-intellectual fideism.9
Pecock’s scholastic conception of the ‘doom of resoun ’
Pecock uses both Thomistic and Scotistic arguments in his description of the
relation of truths that we can know by light of reason to truths that we can
know by light of faith alone. If his aim really is to pursue a via media between
scepticism and fideism by espousing some version of Aristotelian synthesis,
then the way in which he describes the relation between reason and will may
help us to identify what structure of synthesis he envisages. As is generally
known, Thomas Aquinas and his followers argued for the primacy of reason
over the will, while Duns Scotus and his followers emphasised the will’s
control over the intellect’s action.10 Pecock, as it happens, champions the
primacy of the reason over the will, echoing Aquinas.11 Unfortunately, we
cannot conclude that Pecock is thereby a Thomist by virtue of his answer to
this fundamental question. The tendency among Oxford philosophers in the
period after Wyclif was to avoid alignment with specific schools like
Thomism, Ockhamism or Scotism. They preferred instead to stitch together
patchwork quilts in which Thomas’s arguments are arranged cheek-by-jowl
with Scotist and Ockhamist arguments. An illuminating instance of this can
9 Jacob suggests this in ‘Reynold Pecock’, 30–4, arguing that Pecock’s desire was to
resurrect Aristotelian synthetic philosophical theology, rescuing it from the scepticism of the
moderni and the anti-intellectualism of mystics like the author of the Cloud of unknowing. For the
intellectual atmosphere at Oxford in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries see J. I. Catto,
‘Theology after Wycliffism’, in J. I. Catto and R. Evans (eds), The history of the University of
Oxford, ii, Oxford 1992, 263–80, and William Courtenay, Schools and scholars in fourteenth-century
England, Princeton 1987.
10 For Aquinas on the primacy of the intellect see Sententia super posteriora analytica i.6.2–4;
Summa theologicae Ia.Q.82.2c, and also Norman Kretzman, ‘Philosophy of mind’, in Norman
Kretzman and Eleonore Stump (eds), The Cambridge companion to Aquinas, Cambridge 1993,
144–9. For Scotus on the primacy of the will see Opus oxoniense ii, dist.42, qq.1–4, nn. 10–11, and
Duns Scotus on the will and morality, selected and trans. Alan B. Wolter OFM, Washington, DC
1997, 37–9, 150–1.
11 ‘ [R]esoun in his worching go bifore Þe wil in his wirching and Þat will folowe resound an
not go bifore vtterly Þe resound so Þat Þe wil chese and refuse and comaunde to be doon or to
be vndoon what Þat resoun bifore haÞ deemed to be chosun or refusid to be comaundid to be
doon or to be chosun or refusid to be comaundid to be doon or to be vndoon, and Þat Þe fre
wil no Þing chese, refuse or comaunde saue what and how Þe resoun bifrore haÞ jugid and
deemed to be chosun, refusid or comaundid, or to be chesable or refusable ’ : Reule iii.1, p. 228.
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be found in Leonard Kennedy’s account of John Sharpe’s contemporary
commentary, De anima ; here we see just this kind of eclectic approach
in action.12 This practice is evident in Pecock’s extant works ; while he
argues for reason’s primacy over the will, he argues – with Scotus, against
Aquinas – that the human reason cannot establish the immortality of the
soul, while rejecting other aspects of Scotus’ philosophical theology.13
The place to begin is with Pecock’s account of how we reason, and why
the inferential process based in our experience in the world results in certain
knowledge. These questions acquired a new degree of difficulty when
Ockham suggested that it was possible to have intuitive cognition of non-
existent objects if God so desired. That is, in answering the question of what
kinds of things we can perceive, and what is the relation between perceiver
and perceived, Ockham posed for himself the question of whether God could
so affect human understanding as to cause us to perceive things that are not
really there. God can directly cause anything for which a secondary cause is
used, a proposition which prompted Ockham to allow that God could cause
us to see something – that is, cause an event of perception to occur within
us – without the object being perceived – namely, the secondary cause by
which God causes that perception event – existing.14 While Ockham’s intent
here was not to open floodgates of sceptical inquiry, but only to explain how
his theory of direct perception was an improvement on Scotus’ intuitive
cognition, later proponents of Ockham’s method advanced an epistemology
more injurious to the possibility of certain knowledge than had hitherto been
encountered. John of Mirecourt, Pierre d’Ailly and Nicholas of Autrecourt
figure among fourteenth-century philosophers famous for having doubted
the equivalence of certainty of what we perceive to the certainty of math-
ematical or logical reasoning.15 Whether or not Ockham’s epistemological
speculation itself leads to scepticism, enough philosophers who had
embraced his approach thought that it did to undermine the trustworthiness of
experientially based reasoning. What makes Pecock difficult to characterise
12 Leonard A. Kennedy CSB, ‘The De anima of John Sharpe’, Franciscan Studies xxix (1969),
249–70.
13 Consideration of the comparability of Pecock’s demonstration of God’s existence in
Reule, prolog, 1–7 to Scotus’ argument for triple primacy as it appears in De primo principio is
beyond the scope of this article, but warrants further analysis.
14 William Ockham, Quodlibeta VI, q.6, in Quodlibetal questions 2, trans. Alfred Freddoso, New
Haven 1991, 506–8. See also Marilyn Adams, William Ockham, Notre Dame 1987, 551–629;
John Boler, ‘ Intuitive and abstractive cognition’, in Norman Kretzman, Anthony Kenny and
Jan Pinborg (eds), The Cambridge history of later medieval philosophy, Cambridge 1982, 460–78;
Sebastian Day, Intuitive cognition : a key to the significance of the later scholastics, St Bonaventure, NY
1947; and Philotheus Boehner, ‘The Notitia Intuitiva of non-existents according to William
Ockham’, in E. M. Buytaert (ed.), Collected articles on Ockham, St Bonaventure, NY 1992,
268–99.
15 See Julius Weinberg, Nicholas of Autrecourt : a study in fourteenth-century thought, New York
1969, 175–93, and Heiko Oberman, The harvest of medieval theology, Harvard 1963, 242–8.
REG INALD PECOCK ON THE AUTHOR ITY OF REASON 239
on this and other philosophical issues is that he does not actually say, ‘And in
response to Ockham, who casts in doubt the possibility of certain knowledge
based on empirically based reasoning in doubt, I say this ’. This is because
none of his surviving works were directed towards an academic audience; all
of what follows appears in various places in the Reule of Chrysten religioun, The
folower to the Donet and The repressor, which were written expressly for the
instruction of the laity. Indeed, Mishtooni Bose has recently argued
convincingly that Pecock’s intent was not to address epistemology in rec-
ognisably formal academic discourse. She suggests that Pecock’s desire was to
recover an earlier scholastic discourse sensitive to the rhetorical repercussions
of theological discourse outside the academic lecture hall.16 Thus, if we are to
make sense of the reasoning behind Pecock’s teaching, we should attempt
some philosophical reconstruction of Pecock’s original position.
What does Pecock believe is involved in an act of rational decision-making,
and what exactly is a ‘doom of resoun’? Pecock follows standard Aristotelian
epistemological procedure in part I, ch.vi of the Folower by identifying the act
of reasoning as among the five kinds of ‘ inward workings ’ shared by beasts
and men. All of the higher animals are capable of doing more than merely
perceiving objects with the five senses (or ‘outward wits ’). They can make
judgements using the ‘common wit ’ about these objects based on their sense
experiences regarding the objects’ movement or lack thereof, size, number
and figure, and they are capable of the mental act of imagining, or calling to
mind and sorting amongst their sense experiences. I can think of the redness
of a given apple apart from the other aspects of the apple – its smell, weight,
taste and so on – by using my imagination, but I can also think of the gold
sheen of the fruit of Eden’s orchard, which I have never experienced. This,
Pecock explains, is fantasy, the imagining of things never experienced, which
we combine from past sense experiences. Fourth, after common wit, imagin-
ing and fantasy, is what he calls estimation, the capacity to recognise natural
enmity, friendship and so on, which falls beyond mere common wit, but
cannot rightly be called ‘ judgement ’ as it seems more like perception than a
higher activity. Finally, the inward capacity of combining and sorting
through these mental acts must itself be something apart from the acts, and
this he calls ‘mind’. All of these inward wits exist somewhere in the head, but
in different parts of it, for ‘oon celle of Þe heed may not serue to estimacioun
and to mynde, neiÞir to estimacioun and to ymaginacioun’.17 In the back of
the head, in addition to these five inward wits, is the power of movement,
since, as all sinews are the means by which movement is possible, and all
sinews spread out from the back of the head, it must then follow that the
power of their movement must be located there.
16 Mishtooni Bose, ‘Two phases of scholastic self-consciousness : reflections on method in
Aquinas and Pecock’, in Paul Van Geest, Harm Goris and Carlo Leget (eds), Aquinas as
authority, Utrecht 2002, 87–108. 17 Folower I.7, p. 31.6–9.
240 STEPHEN E. LAHEY
Reason is a capacity more advanced than any of these inward mental
capacities, but Pecock sees no cause to restrict it to human beings alone. This
is a departure from the standard Aristotelian approach, but since our
experiences shows us how hounds track rabbits stealthily and how other
kinds of animals can use cunning to work their wiles, it is impossible to deny
that they must be reasoning:
Sone, it is commounli holde of summe philesofris Þat no beest may in his wittes make
discurse, Þat is to seie, a cowplyng togidere of two treuÞis to him bifore knowen,
forto conclude in foorm of argument Þe iii treuÞ, and Þerbi Þe same iii treuÞ to be
knowen first of Þe same beest. NeuerÞeles, y se not as zit eny inconuenyence which
wole lette forto holde Þat beestis mowe and kunnen forme proposicions, argue and
proue and gete knowyng to hem bi argument of verri silogisme and of induccioun
about Þo Þingis whiche Þei mowe bi her outward and inward wittis perceyue; Þouz
Þei not so parfijtli as a man may and kanne argue about Þe same Þingis and about
many mo.18
This would mean that animals produce mental propositions and construct
inductive syllogisms about things that they perceive, which Pecock admits to
be a bit hard to believe.19 Yet when a dog sees a piece of meat lying under the
table, and has been beaten for taking such gifts of providence in the past, he
will forbear, despite his evidently powerful lust to eat the fallen meat. What
goes on in the dog’s mind appears to be this :
Premiss 1 : Anything delightful that involves more pain in its acquisition than
the pleasure of its enjoyment will allow is to be avoided.
Premiss 2 : If I take this delectable morsel, I shall be sorely beaten, resulting in
more pain than the morsel would provide in the pleasure of consuming it.
Conclusion: I shall forbear.
The second premiss here is by no means certain knowledge; it is only likely,
but follows from this line of reasoning:
Premiss 2a: For whatever I was likely to have been beaten in the past, I am
likely to be beaten now, if it happens that I am beaten now.
18 Ibid. I.8, p. 36.8–19.
19 Some earlier philosophers had not ruled out the possibility of rationality in non-human
animals. Roger Bacon held that animals syllogise in making decisions based on sense
perceptions, involving the recognition of previously perceived individuals, classifying
individuals as members of species and deliberating about action based on spatial relations.
The critical distinction between man and non-human beings lies in the human capacity to be
conscious of the discursive process to the point of delineating premisses and conclusions ; non-
human animals reason instinctively and unconsciously. Likewise Albertus Magnus attributed a
degree of rational capacity to non-human animals, based on their ability to be trained by man.
See Peter G. Sobol, ‘The shadow of reason: explanations of intelligent animal behavior in the
thirteenth century’, in Joyce E. Salisbury (ed.), The medieval world of nature, New York 1993,
109–28, and Richard Sorabji, Animal minds and human morals, Ithaca 1993, 195–207.
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Premiss 2b: I was often beaten for the taking of such fallen morsels in the
past.
2 Conclusion: Therefore I will very likely be beaten for taking this fallen
morsel.
While the overall conclusion, that of deciding not to take the fallen morsel, is
based on a conclusion that is obviously only inductive knowledge, yet is this
knowledge obtained by the exercise of reason, even if this be the syllogising of
a hound.20
Aside from the insight into the workings of a dog’s mind, this example
shows what Pecock envisages the ‘doom of resoun’ to be: the process of
constructing a new proposition reflecting some kind of truth by combining
two propositions the truth value of which is already known. That animals are
capable of syllogism is no more noteworthy to Pecock than is the likelihood of
the laity being able to think logically, at least insofar as his opponents among
the clergy appear to believe.21 What is significant for human beings is our
intellectual capacity to begin reasoning from first principles, or axioms that
provide the starting point for all subsequent reasoning. Among these first
principles are ‘All good is to be loved’, ‘All evil is to be avoided’, ‘Each
whole body is greater than its part ’, and so on. We are capable of recognising
these axiomatic first principles upon comprehending the definitions of the
terms involved.22 As we have experiences, we can interpret and judge both
the outside world and ourselves by combining experientially grounded
propositions with these first principles to produce new propositions, the
truth-value of which is reliant upon the truth value of the premisses.
The spectre of scepticism
Little of this differs from Aristotle’s description of the inferential process in
the Posterior analytics, despite its obviously simplified approach. The question
that is more important, given the authority Pecock grants the ‘doom of
resoun’, is how to avoid the pitfalls of scepticism. Is not the exercise of
human reason prone to error? In the first book of the Repressor (ch. 14),
Pecock addresses this problem, using the argument from error to question the
possibility of God having ordained that we use our reason as the primary
20 Folower I.8, p. 36.33–7.16. In Donet 12.1–4 Pecock holds that non-humans can neither
reason nor will freely ; assuming that Pecock wrote the Folower to the Donet after having finished
the Donet, it is safe to take his later position as being the result of a reconsideration of his earlier
one. 21 Folower I.8, p. 37.31–8.12.
22 See Aristotle, Posterior analytics, i.10 [76a30–77a6]. See also T. H. Irwin, Aristotle’s first
principles, Oxford 1992, 196–8. Aquinas and Scotus both follow Aristotle in holding that human
reasoning begins with fundamental first principles. For Aquinas see n. 24 below; for Scotus see
his Questions on the metaphysics of Aristotle, ed. G. Etzkorn and A. Wolter, St Bonaventure, NY
1997, i.2,q.1, pp. 169–72.
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means by which we recognise how best to serve him.23 To this argument from
error, Pecock presents two arguments together in Repressor i.14, which
response he reaffirms in The book of feith i.9.
While the senses do occasionally fail, they are the only means by which
God has enabled us to proceed in the world. Likewise, the fact that reason
sometimes errs is not evidence that God did not mean us to use it to
gain understanding. Although God has not given us a perfect guide, he has
given us this occasionally errant capacity :
And euen so, bi cause that God hath zouen to vs noon other power of resonyng than
which may faile and erre, he wole holde us excusid, thouz we folewe an erroneose
‘doom of resoun’, whilis we ben not necligent but diligent bothe in oure owne
avising and bi counseil taking of othere forto haue a rizt doom in oure resoun; and
he wole allowe, rewarde, accepte, and take oure deede which we doon bi such an
erroneose doom, as ferforth as it were doon bi a rizt doom; al the while that thilk
errour in oure resounys doom is had azens oure wil, and not bi oure consent and
willing or necligence.24
That is, even if we do make mistakes in our reasoning about how best to serve
God, so long as we do so from ignorance and not from willing error, God will
treat our mistake as if it were the truth. Thus reason’s fallibility is not a basis
for dismissing it as sufficient means by which we may judge which actions
serve God.
Two problems at least lie in this argument. First, either any given instance
of our ‘doom of resoun’ is the truth, or it is not ; either conclusion C follows
from premisses A and B, or it does not. If the conclusion does not follow from
the premisses, then either there is no syllogism, no ‘doom of resoun’ and C
is not connected to the combination of A and B, or the syllogism is invalid.
If premisses A and B are the truth and conclusion C follows, yet is false, the
reasoning is invalid – unless God wills it otherwise. How this differs from
the fundamental Ockhamist position that gave rise to the scepticism that
engaged Pecock is unclear. Pecock’s position is equivalent to saying that God
can cause our perception of object X without object X really being so,
although in this case God is willing to recognise our concluding C from
premisses A and B as valid in practice, while invalid in fact. In both cases,
what we recognise as being so differs from what is so, yet God accepts our
recognition as counting for our having perceived the truth.
23 ‘Mannys resoun is a thing whiche in hise doomys and iugementis ofte failith, as
experience ofte schewith. Wherfore it myzte seme that God wolde not him to be oure reule in
deedis of oure service to God. Forwhi this, that God schulde make vs forto leene to a thing
deceyuyng and failing forto performe his seruice, bifittith not his wisdom as it wolde seme’ :
Repressor i.14, p. 73.
24 Ibid. i.14, p. 75. See also Book of feith I.9 : ‘And also that God hath thi werk acceptid and
allowid, into plesaunce and rewarde, as thouz the werk were doon in it silf without erring and
failing ’ (p. 216).
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The alternative interpretation is to hold that our good willing suffices in
cases of mistaken reasoning for God to treat it as good reasoning, meaning
that there are cases in which the will can have primacy over the
understanding. In the first section of the Reule, Pecock denies this possibility,
claiming (with Aquinas) that the reason must first recognise that it is our duty
to serve God as our proper, final end before it can will to obey God, to act
morally.25 To suppose that the will can choose the good before recognising it
is ridiculous. But in any given situation to want to recognise the right choice
amongst a set of possible choices surely precedes identifying the right choice;
how could I know the right thing without first wanting to know the right
thing? Here is where we are different from other animals, Pecock says ; what
distinguishes us is not whether or not we want to obey the law, but whether
we recognise what is in accord with it. This law of conscience is the hallmark
of humanity, he later declares :
And Þis ‘doom of resoun’ is Þilk lawe which is callid lawe of kinde as forto speke of
mannys kynde bi which he is aboue beestis, and it is lawe of conscience ; and to
folewe in Þe wil and in oÞere powers comaundid bi Þe wil Þis ‘doom of resoun’, is Þe
folewing and Þe fulfilling of Þe same sawe of kinde which is propre to man as he is
man, rizt as Þe doom of outward sensitijf wittis or of inward sensitijf wittis, as
ymaginacioun and mynde, is lawe of kynde to beestis, and to folewe Þe doomes and
Þe appetitis of Þilke sensitive inward and outward wittis is Þe folewing and fulfilling
of Þe bestial lawe of kynde, and to folewe Þe natural inclinaciouns wiÞout knowing is
Þe fulfilling of lawe of kynde in vnlyuyng Þingis, as is fier to ascende, erÞe to falle
doun, watir to kele, and so forÞ of oÞere 26
If Pecock’s first argument against scepticism is questionable, what of his se-
cond? Here he distinguishes between our capacity to reason and the activity,
or ‘doom’, of reasoning. The activity proceeds via syllogism, the premisses of
which are both known as either likely to be true or unquestionably true. How
are the premisses known to be true? Through the demonstration of the
syllogisms that establish them, on back to the first principles of reasoning.27
25 ‘ [A]lle Þe deedis of oure wil, wheÞer Þey ben ynward deedis or outward deedis of oure
wil, and wheÞer Þei ben next deedis of Þi wil as ben willingis and nyllyngs, or wheÞer Þei ben
deedis comaundid of Þe wil, Þat Þei obeie and be so doon or left to be doon as resoun jugiÞ
hem to be doon or to be left vndoon, fforwhi Þe natural office of resoun is forto schewe what
Þe wille ouzte chese or refuse, commaund or forbede to be doon in outward deedis or in
inward deedis in eny oÞer power of Þe sould dyvers fro Þe wil, and Þe natural office of Þe wil is
forto conforme hym to Þilk schewing of resoun’ : Reule, prolog, 24. Compare with Thomas
Aquinas, Summa theologica, IaIIae, Q .9, a.1. See also Folower I.16, pp. 83–6.
26 Reule iii.1, p. 229.
27 ‘That the power of resoun is himsilf is not ordeyned of God to be oure next and best and
surest reuler or reule anentis alle resonable treuthis, but the doom of reson is ordeyned to so
be; and zit not ech doom of resoun, but thilk doom of resoun which is a formal complete
argument clepid a sillogisme in resoun, whos bothe premissis ben sureli or likeli knowen for
trewe, and that bi hem silf or bi sume othere bifore had lijk sillogisme or sillogismes prouyng
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Using this method, the ‘doom of resoun’ never fails ; each of the nineteen
valid syllogistic modes (BARBARA, CELARENT, etc.) leads to certain
knowledge. Mistakes arise when we either commit errors in the construction
of the syllogism (by not distributing the middle term, for instance) or assume
given premisses to be sufficiently established when they have not been.28
What does ‘ sufficiently established’ mean? If a given premiss is a first
principle, its truth is sufficiently established. If a given premiss is true of
necessity, as with some proposition describing past events, or something
definitionally true, its truth too is sufficiently established. The difference
between these two classes of truths underlies the difference between absolute
and hypothetical necessity, although Pecock regrettably does not address
this ; first principles are true and cannot ever have been not true, so the
necessity of their truth is absolute. Other necessary truths, such as truths of
the past and so on, are now true and cannot be otherwise, although they
could have been otherwise at some time before now. Both classes of
‘ sufficiently established’ truths, when constituting the premisses in a given
syllogism, yield a necessarily true conclusion, which Pecock identifies (along
with most scholastic thinkers) as a demonstrative syllogism. If God were to
will that such a necessarily established truth were not true, Pecock says, it
would still be the truth: ‘ [E]llis creaturis of God myzten verrifie contra-
diccioun, and thilke power is not grauntid creaturis to have, for thilk power is
not to be grauntid of God to have. ’29 But propositions that have merely
probable or likely truth-value, when constituting a syllogism, yield con-
clusions that are only likely to be true; this is probable syllogistic reasoning:
[S]o whanne eny premysse is such that his suer trouthe is not lokid aftir neither souzt
after, but his probabilite or likelihode of trouthe is lokid aftir and souzt afteir, he is to
be resouled upward bi sillogismes, into tyme it be come vp into premyssis of whiche
euere either is openest in likelihode thouz not in suerte, or ellis into premyssis of
which oon is openest in suerte of trouthe and the other is openest in suerte of
likelihode or of probabilite a this side suerte.30
Here Pecock ends his argument against scepticism, presumably intending his
readers to recognise that errors need not detain the rational mind overmuch
so long as they can be traced down to premisses of probable truth value
masquerading as having necessary truth value. This is not very satisfying, for
it leaves one wondering about syllogisms in which necessarily true premisses
the premisse hauyng nede to be proued, into tyme it bicome into premissis openest in suerte or
openest in probabilite or likelihode’ : Repressor i.4, p. 75. See Aristotle, Posterior analytics, i.2,
71b10–72b4; Thomas Aquinas, Sententia super posteriora analytica i.6.2–4; and Scott MacDonald,
‘Theory of knowledge’, in Kretzman and Stump, Cambridge companion to Aquinas, 163–80.
28 Repressor, p. 76. For a general introduction to the modes of syllogistic inference see
William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The development of logic, Oxford 1962, 67–81. See also
Alexander Broadie, Introduction to medieval logic Oxford 1987, 51–67.
29 Book of feith I.6, p. 175. 30 Repressor i.14, pp. 77–8.
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are combined with probably true ones, and about the criteria for determining
the probability of a given truth – are some propositions more or less likely to
be true than others, and why? Pecock will make use of this in his description
of an act of faith, which he argues is an instance of just this kind of movement
from the certain to the probable or likely, as we will see below.
Is a thing true because it is in Scripture, or is it in Scripture because it is true ?
If Pecock had been comfortable with a simplified Thomistic view of Scripture
as revealed divine law, provided to us expressly to assist in human salvation,
he would not have encountered the ecclesiastical trouble he did. But his goal
was to convince Lollards that scriptural authority is not final in all matters,
and so he argued vigorously for the applicability of human reason to the
sustained critical analysis of all truths of Scripture :
Crist wolde never have gove suche a lawe to be hadde, and to be contynued in his
name … ne were that it myzte abide the fier of triel and of examinacioun of ech
creturis resoun, so the examinacioun be … forto examine and prove whether a feith
pretense be trewe feith or no, as fer forth as eny goldsmyth wole avowe to warante
his gold, which he delyvereth to be tried and examyned bi al maner fier of this
worldli brennyng.31
If Holy Scripture is a worthy source for truths not evident to reason, he
worries, it could easily be argued that we might discard reason as a means to
interpret it :
Wherefore it mizte seme that God wolde not subdewe or submitte and remytte and
sende him to resoun, for to be interpretid and be expowned and dressid into trewe
and dewe sense and vndirstonding; and that bothe for resoun is a reule failing in his
doom, and al so for that Holi Scriptures affermyng vpon a mater is more worthi than
is the doom of mannis resoun.32
Pecock’s solution involves distinguishing between scriptural truths that are
available to unaided human reason, and the revealed truths necessary for
salvation that exceed reason’s capacity. Pecock had already argued that a
truth’s appearance in Scripture did not entail that truth’s foundation in
Scripture ; if the truth is evident to unaided human reason, then the ‘doom of
resoun’ is its foundation:‘[N]o vertu or gouernaunce or trouthe into which
the doom of mannis resoun may sufficientli ascende and come to, for to it
fynde, leerne, and knowe withoute reuelacioun fro God mad ther vpon, is
groundid in Holi Scripture. ’33 The scriptural commandment to humility
(‘mekenes ’) is grounded not on its appearance in the book containing God’s
31 Book of feith I.2, p. 135. 32 Repressor i.14, p. 73.
33 Ibid. i.2, p. 10. See also Reule, prolog, pp. 22–3.
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revealed truth, but in the ‘doom of resoun’, for the goodness of the virtue of
humility is evident to any rational being.
What euer deede or thing doom of resoun dooth as fulli and as perfitli as Holi
Scripture it dooth, Holi Scripture it not dooth oonli or al oon; but so it is, that what
euer leernyng and kunnyng Holi Scripture zeueth upon eny of the now seid
gouernancis, trouthes, and vertues (that is to seie, upon eny gouernaunce, trouthe,
and vertue of Goddis lawe to man, in to whos fynding, leernyng, and knowing
mannis resoun may bi him silf aloon, or with natural helpis, rise and come,) mannis
resoun may and can zeue the same leerning and knowing, as experience ther upon to
be take anoon wole schewe.34
Just because Christian society has traditionally asserted that many of its
moral rules appear in Scripture in order to get people to follow them, it does
not follow that these moral rules have Scripture as their foundation.35 Indeed,
the bulk of Pecock’s extant writings focus on his exposition of the wholly
rational moral code that, combined with the sacraments and faithful
acceptance of those truths not evident to reason, are likely to ensure a well-
lived Christian life. Sceptics who demand to know where Pecock finds his
systematic approach in Scripture deserve the response,
‘Where findist thou it groundid in tailour craft? ’ whanne that a pointe or a treuthe
and a conclusion of sadeler craft is affermed, seid, and mynistrid to hem: or ellis thus,
‘Where fyndist thou it groundid in bocheri? ’ whanne a point or a treuthe and
conclusion of masonrie is affermed and seid and mynystrid to hem.36
The truths not evident to unaided reason are few, and consist primarily of
issues about the triune divine nature, the Incarnation and the Resurrection.37
For these, we need the authority of Holy Scripture, but this is not to say that
reason plays no part in the understanding of these truths. The ‘doom of feith’
is a kind of knowing, and the capacity to accept a truth on faith must be a
part of the rational power. This rational grounding determines how we ought
to limit speculation about the objects of faith:
[S]iÞen feiÞ is a knowingal vertu – Þat is to seie such where wiÞ we knowen sum
truÞe and is Þe knowing of Þe same trouÞ – and oure resoun may not knowe eny
trouÞe and consente Þerto wiÞoute Þis Þat oure resoun haue euydencis forto so
consente – zhe and grettir euydencis forto so consente Þan he haÞ to Þe contrarie
party – and nooun euydencis mowe zeue informacioun into resoun but if he make to
hym silf an argument bi knyttyng of euydencis to gidere – … wherefore folewiÞ Þat
oure resoun may not juge and deme and telle to vs Þat Þis or Þilk article is to be taken
for feiÞ more Þan eny oÞer poynt or article is to be taken for feiÞ.38
34 Repressor i.2, pp. 11–12. 35 Ibid. i.4, p. 21.
36 Ibid. i.10, pp. 48–9. 37 Book of feith I.2, p. 133.
38 Reule iv.1, pp. 425–6. Pecock refers us to Folower I.16 ; see pp. 62–86.
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To approach Holy Scripture one needs a facility in the ‘doom of resoun’ ;
without it, the result must be misinterpretation, heresy and the inevitable
social turmoil that follows. Thus the signal criterion for understanding
Scripture is not moral purity, but rational acuity. This means that a learned
clergy is necessary for ecclesiastical – and social – health, and is more
important than a moral clergy.39 As a consequence, the ‘doom of resoun’ is
needed even regarding scriptural truths not evident to its purview.
Given this argument in the earlier pages of the Repressor, Pecock is free to
respond to criticisms that he devalues Scripture as a source of authority. We
distinguish between the physical pieces of parchment or vellum on which the
letters appear and the truths that we understand when we interpret our
perceptions of the letters on the parchment or vellum. Similarly we
distinguish between the actual deed of reasoning, the ‘making proposicioiuns
of simple wordis and termys knyt to gidere, and making sillogismys of
proposiciouns knyzt to gidere bi teching of certein reulis ’, and the comprehen-
sion of the conclusion of the syllogism, or the acceptance of the conclusion
that follows from the knitting together.40 The conclusions of Holy Scripture
that we are to accept on faith, such as the immortality of the soul, the triune
divine nature and so on, lack the ready acceptability to the human mind that
the conclusions of reason have. Thus, any conclusion of reason that is echoed
in Scripture, such as ‘do not murder’, ‘ love thy neighbour’, has as its primary
authority not its appearance in Scripture, but its apparent truth to the rational
mind. The truths to be accepted by faith lack this, and so cannot really
be compared, despite their appearing in the same place as the rationally
evident truths. While ‘doom of resoun’ is necessary to sort among the
truths of Scripture, it does not provide a foundation for every one of those
truths.
Reason’s limits : Pecock’s use of Scotus on the soul’s immortality
Not every doctor of theology has been sufficiently careful in distinguishing
between the truths in Scripture that are founded by the ‘doom of resoun’ and
those founded in scriptural authority. The question of the evidence for the
immortality of the soul is an example: Aquinas believed that the soul’s
survival of the body was capable of rational demonstration, exceeding the
boundaries of what Pecock believed to be reason’s purview. Aquinas’s
argument in Summa theologica depends on assuming that the soul has being in
39 In direct response to Lollards and Hussites, Pecock says, ‘Open experience schewith that
a viciose man is as kunnyng a clerk for to finde, leerne, and vndirstonde which is the trewe and
dew sentence of Holi Scripture, how soone a vertuouse clerk is kunnyng thereto’ : Repressor i.17,
p. 93. 40 Ibid. i.15, p. 82.
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itself and so can only be corrupted by virtue of some principle related to
subsistent forms, not by the principle by which matter is generated and
corrupted. Since this corrupting principle would have to include that which
is contrary to the soul to successfully corrupt the soul, and since the soul has
no contrary, it must follow that the soul is incorruptible.41
Scotus responds to Aquinas’s argument in Opus oxoniensis IV, dist.43, q.2 by
establishing that natural reason cannot prove the soul’s immortality. He
demonstrates the ambiguity of Aquinas’s conception of being in itself : either
Aquinas is a Platonist, and must admit that the form of any being exists
in itself apart from material instantiation, or his version of the soul’s being in
itself would be incommunicable to the material in which it subsists.42 Scotus
reviews nine such a priori arguments in favour of the soul’s immortality, and
concludes that there are none in which the premisses are both necessarily
true and evident. For this criterion to be met, the premisses that lead to the
conclusion ‘ the soul is immortal ’ would have to be grounded in necessary
truth, truths which cannot not be true. The premisses in the arguments
Scotus reviews are only contingently true – it is equally likely that God would
have willed that things had been otherwise – meaning that none of these
proofs for the soul’s immortality are demonstrably compelling a priori
arguments. Given Aristotle’s description of the operation of the intellect, he
continues, one can create a coherent interpretation of his conception of the
soul without including its immortality. Arguments that use interpretations of
Aristotle sympathetic to the soul’s immortality are likely do so based on
propositions adopted by philosophers for extra-rational purposes. Natural
reason, Scotus concludes, cannot prove the necessity of the soul’s survival of
the body; this must be held by faith alone.
Pecock’s approach to the problem likewise distinguishes between those
elements evident to reason and those that must be held by faith alone.
Although his argument ends differently to that of Scotus, the two agree that
while it is desirable for reason to demonstrate the soul’s immortality, the
premisses involved in the demonstration are not sufficiently indubitable as to
provide satisfaction of that desire.43 That there is such a thing as a rational
soul is evident by virtue of our capacity to recognise truths syllogistically
41 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica Ia, q.75, a.6. See also Quaestiones de anima, q.14, in
which Aquinas argues from the soul’s capacity to comprehend abstracted, universal,
incorruptible forms to its incorruptible nature.
42 Opus oxoniensis IV, dist.43, q.2. See Duns Scotus, Philosophical writings, trans. Allan Wolter
OFM, Indianapolis 1987, 134–62, esp. pp. 153–4.
43 Ockham’s argument against the possibility of rationally establishing the soul’s
immortality also emphasises the contingent nature of the premisses used in such a
demonstration; see Quodlibet I.10 ; given Pecock’s apparent antipathy towards the scepticism
associated with Ockhamism, as well as his apparent predisposition to Scotistic and Thomistic
synthesis, it is difficult to believe that he would have made much use of Ockham’s arguments
in this matter.
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demonstrated.44 The nature of a soul defines its final good, and since reason
and will are the defining characteristics of our soul, the end towards which
our reason and will move must exceed all their imaginable objects. Since this
end is not achieved in time, the final end of the soul in reason and willing
must be something exceeding anything temporally imaginable, a final good
infinitely surpassing all temporal goods, i.e. God.45
All that God provides for us is given so that we may more effectively attain
our final end. If all that God had intended for us were a natural reward, this
would most likely have been the worship of God for a good life or, in turn,
punishment for a vicious one. This would not necessarily involve an afterlife,
but the possibility of an afterlife in which reward or punishment were meted
out in accord with one’s behaviour in this life does not fly in the face of
reason.46 So also is the resurrection of the body imaginable, even if it does
seem miraculous. But the rationality of contingent, or possible, premisses
leading to the soul’s immortality do not suffice; the ‘doom of feith’ alone
provides evidence of a supernatural end for human beings.47 Given faith in
the soul’s immortality, the ‘doom of resoun’ is able to conclude that our
natural end involves rational and volitional satisfaction in the eternal worship
of God. As with Scotus, mere rational tenability does not suffice for holding
premisses that would lead to the soul’s immortality. While Pecock does not
frame his argument in terms of interpreting Aristotle’s conception of the soul,
his criterion for the admissibility of a premiss in a demonstration of the
rationality of the soul’s immortality is similar to Scotus.48
Pecock does not end his discussion of the soul’s immortality here, though;
he continues by asserting that the soul’s absence of need for the body is
manifest in its exercise of reason despite physical injury. Although it
follows his admission that the ‘doom of feith ’ is necessary to prove the
immortality of the soul, this argument appears to lead towards an a priori
rational demonstration:
44 Reule i.1, pp. 37–8. Here, as in the Donet, Pecock denies rationality to ‘beestis ’, giving
support to the hypothesis that he wrote the Reule at the same time as he wrote the Donet,
following which he wrote the Folower (though perhaps still engaged in the Reule).
45 Reule i.2, pp. 43–6: ‘And so in Þis wise we arisen from Þe knowyng of vs silf in oure soulis
side into knowing of oure god, as it myzte liztly and soone to manye men seeme. ’ The
desirability of infinite goodness of the divine nature leads Pecock to a proof of the necessity of
God’s being, and a consideration of the divine nature which takes up the rest of the Reule’s first
treatise. 46 Ibid. ii.2, pp. 103–5.
47 ‘Þis treuÞ may not be knowe of vs bi eny certeynte neiÞer bi eny greet likelihode of
resoun leenyng to Þe mater in it silf, but bi feiÞ oonly; and Þerfore bi holy scripture it may be
knowe Þus ’ : ibid. ii.2, p. 106. Pecock furnishes several biblical references (Isaiah lx.19;
Wisdom v.16; 1 John v.11 ; John xvii.3 ; Romans vii.22) to support the soul’s immortality here,
along with brief quotations – in Latin.
48 Perhaps more similar to Scotus than to Ockham, given the thesis that Pecock’s thought is
more prone to that of the Aristotelian synthesists than to the moderni.
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If mannys soule be so free fro bondage of ech body Þat summe of hise powers neden
not to Þe body in her worchingis as eny inmediat and next instrument, myche raÞer
mannys soule in his substaunce and his being is so free fro bondage of ech body Þat it
nediÞ not into keping and contynuyng of his beyng and livyng eny body as a Þing or
an instrument necessarie forto bi it so kepe and continue his being and his lijf ; but so
it is Þat Þese owers of Þe soule, resoun and wil, neden not eny body as an instrument
for her worchingis, as is now bifore in Þis processe arguyd: wherefore neiÞer mannys
soule is so boonde Þat he nediÞ to be kept and contynued in his beyng by strengÞe
and vertu of eny body.49
If the principal actions of the soul do not depend on the well-being of any one
body part, why should the being of the soul depend upon the well-being of
the body? The obvious response is that, while the sailor may not need any
one part of the boat to stay afloat, if the whole boat sinks, the sailor is likely to
sink as well. Pecock undoubtedly recognises this, since he continues with the
justification that, while the sufficient likelihood of such a demonstration is not
equable to certainty, it is in most cases enough for the case at hand, so long as
the denial of the proposition demonstrated is not equally likely :
It is Þerfore ynouz for Þe holding of eny Þing to be trewe Þat Þerto be so greet
evidencis likely Þat to Þe contrarie be not had so moche likely, and ech such and so
knowen Þing as we ouzten and ben bounde bi lawe of kynde forto holde as trewe al
Þe while Þat Þo evidencis wiÞ Þe seyd oÞere to Þe contrarie be had, as y schewe in
oÞere placis of my writyngis.50
That is, so long as it is more likely that the soul, given its lack of the need for
particular body parts in reasoning and willing, will not really need a body for
its continued survival than that it would need a body, it is rational to
conclude that the soul is likely to survive the body after death. Those in need
of more certainty, Pecock concludes, must rely on the ‘doom of feith’.
The result for our discussion is a demonstration of what Pecock believes to
be the place of scriptural authority in establishing the province of the ‘doom
of resoun’, and what falls to the ‘doom of feith ’. The ‘doom of resoun’ relies
on syllogistic inference, either demonstratively true, in which the conclusion
necessarily follows from the premisses, or probably true, in which the con-
clusion follows from the premisses in all likelihood. In the latter cases, the
chain of reasoning that produces the probably true syllogism can be traced
up to at least one demonstratively true syllogism, thereby providing adequate
foundation for a conclusion lacking necessary certainty. The ‘doom of re-
soun’ can, at best, establish that the soul is likely to survive the body’s death,
and if more certainty is desired, faith is needed. Scriptural authority provides
sufficient support for a case such as this, but its authority proceeds no farther :
‘ [Holi Scripture] muste needis grounde treuthis and conclusions … into
49 Reule ii.4, p. 116. 50 Ibid. ii.4, p. 117.
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which mannis witt mai not bi it silf and bi natural help without reuelacioun
mad therto fro God uprise and come to, forto hem kunne and knowe. ’51
This can be interpreted in two ways: Pecock could be saying that any
Christian truth not directly grounded in demonstrative syllogism requires the
‘doom of feith’ as its foundation, making Scripture a significant authority,
but he could also be read as saying that any Christian truth not at some point
grounded in demonstrative syllogism requires the ‘doom of feith’ as its
foundation, making Scripture little more than a final resort. Much depends
on how evident the Christian truth’s foundation in demonstrative syllogism
is to the ‘doom of resoun’. Pecock frames his discussion in terms of how evi-
dent a truth is to the ‘doomof resoun’, and not to thewill alone, or to the union
of will and intellect, and that provides the key to the correct interpretation:
zit wheÞir eny of Þese poyntis or eny oÞir such poynt or article ouzte to be bileeuyd
of vs bi feiÞ or no, oure resoun must deme, and to Þis Þat eche of hem ouzte be
bileeuyd of vs by feiÞ for a trouÞ, oure resoun muste haue euydencis, and so grete
euydencis Þat to Þe contrari he haÞ noon so grete.52
Without the guidance of natural reason, the ‘doom of feith’ is not possible ;
we have to construct an argument by which to evaluate the tenability of a
given Christian truth, and if that argument cannot establish the truth by
reason alone, that argument must make use of the ‘doom of feith’ as a
premiss supporting the Christian truth. The ‘doom of feith’ serves as a last-
ditch verificative force in cases when the ‘doom of resoun’ is incapable of
deciding between the truth and falsity of a given premiss leading to a
Christian truth. In the case of the soul’s immortality, the Christian truth to be
established is that ‘The soul survives the body’s death’ :
Premiss 1 : All living things move towards their natural end, which is defined
by their soul.
Premiss 2 : The nature of a soul defines its final good, and since reason and
will are the defining characteristics of our soul, the end towards which our
reason and will move must exceed all their imaginable objects.
These two premisses, evident to unaided natural reason, can only yield
Conclusion 1: The natural end of the human soul must exceed the
imaginable objects of reason and will.
This does not mean that the natural end of the human soul is to survive the
body’s death, despite the fact that the soul’s survival would be sufficient for
conclusion 1 to be true. What is needed is an argument connecting
conclusion 1 with Christian truth. Taking conclusion 1 as the first premiss of
this argument, the following argument is possible :
51 Repressor i.7, p. 36. 52 Folower I.15, p. 74.16–21.
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Premiss 3: Since the reason andwill can imagine eternal being, the natural end
of the soul must involve eternal being, of which there is only one, i.e. God.
Conclusion 2: The natural end of the human soul is God.
This, Pecock holds, is as far as the ‘doom of resoun’ can go: while it would be
rationally comprehensible that the means of attaining that end would be the
human soul’s survival of the body’s death, other means by which that end
might be attained are imaginable. Although Pecock does not provide any
examples of these other means, he could have in mind the possibility of one
Platonic form of soul in which human souls participate, akin to the Averroist
conception of Agent Intellect. Christian truth can only be attained by using a
premiss given by Holy Scripture:
Premiss 4: Individual enjoyment of a divine reward or punishment is
promised by Scripture.
Thus, the ‘doom of feith’ serves as a third means by which reason can
establish truths by syllogism, for use when demonstratively true and probably
true premisses do not yield Christian truths.
The ‘doom of feith ’ and the place of ecclesiastical authority
Faith, Pecock explains, is one of the intellectual (‘kunnyngal ’) virtues, and is
divisible into ‘certeyn’ and ‘sure science’ and ‘opynyoun’.53 This does not
necessarily mean that, if certain knowledge is a species of faith, Pecock is
submitting to sceptical tendencies. What we accept as true can be either
accepted because of what is naturally evident to us by ‘doom of resoun’, or
because of the likely veracity of what someone else tells us, so both are means
by which knowing is possible, and so are instances of ‘kunnyng’ :
And so feiÞ propirli takun, as it conteyneÞ Þese two now seid spicis, is in it silf a spice
of Þilk kunnyng which, with intellect, departiÞ (divides) knowyng into intellect and
kunnyng; which kunnyng is departid into opynyoun and science.54
If I know a thing, this is because either I understand it as being necessarily
true (by demonstrative syllogism), or because I have ‘kunnyng’ of it.
‘Kunnyng’ can either be based in, on the one hand, what is evident to the
senses, or to scientific reasoning based on sense data (probable syllogism), or,
on the other hand, in opinion. That faith is intrinsically connected to the
‘doom of resoun’ is underscored by Pecock’s analysis of an individual act of
faith in The book of feith. Every instance of the mind’s acceptance of a given
53 Ibid. I.12, p. 62. See also Repressor ii.1, p. 131. ‘Kunnyngal ’ virtues are those which
‘disposen, araien, and parfiten resoun or Þe vndirstondyng or Þe intellect, so Þat bi hem Þe
hauer of hem, wheÞir he be man or aungel, is knowyng sum Þing’, as opposed to the moral
virtues, which pertain to the will, and the natural virtues, which are inborn: Folower I.10, p.
47.7–11. 54 Ibid. I.12, p. 63.26–9.
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proposition C on faith involves beginning from some already understood and
accepted proposition A, and proceeding from there to the acceptance of a
proposition of the form ‘If A then C’. The reason for accepting this middle
proposition is the mind’s trust in a reliable witness.55 The problem lies in
what makes for a reliable witness, and how to tell one from something less
trustworthy.
Opinion, Pecock continues, is a
trowyng wherbi we assenten to eny Þing as to a treuÞ, bi cause of likli euydencis
not sure and sikir which we haue Þerto taken bi mocioun risyng of Þe Þing in it silf
or of his cirsumstauncis, Þouz no persoon seie eny Þing Þerto forto witnesse it to be
trewe.56
Pecock’s example is that if I see a red sky in the morning, I can expect a rainy
day,while a red sky at night suggests a fair day tomorrow.This, while not on the
same level of knowing as empirically grounded syllogism (as with the example
of reasoning given with the dog and the fallen morsel), is still classifiable as
kunnyng by virtue of its likelihood given past experiences. Thus, we have
‘scienciel ’, or scientific, and ‘opinyonal kunnyng’, in addition to that which
is known with the certitude of demonstrative syllogism. We are said to have
faith in the reasoning of demonstrative syllogism when we assent to its truth,
and have faith in scientific ‘kunnyng’ when we accept the likelihood of
probable syllogism, and faith in ‘opinyonal kunnyng’ when we believe what
someone else tells us without other forms of verification. Hence, Pecock
reasons, faith must be a branch of ‘kunnyng’, a means by which that which is
certain and that which is taken without sure evidence is accepted by our
intellect. It is noteworthy that Pecock’s example is taken fromMatthew xvi.2,
3. Here Jesus mocks the Pharisees who had asked for a sign of some sort from
heaven by giving a commonplace of primitive meteorology in place of the
sign of divinity their arrogance keeps them from seeing with their own eyes.
That Pecock uses Christ’s familiar example here – certainly one familiar to
the Lollards – illustrates his contention that God intends that reason be used
in interpreting matters of faith.
Then again, Pecock continues, the six intellectual (‘kunnyngal ’) virtues
may also be listed as intellect, science, prudence, craft, opinion and faith, in
which case scientific ‘kunnyng’ and opinion differ from faith. That part of
scientific ‘kunnyng’ which includes faith must be classifiable as faith, and also
with opinion, meaning that faith is divisible into ‘sciencial feiÞ’ and
‘opinyonal feiÞ’. This leaves little for science save that whereby ‘we knowen
a louz and a derk speculatijf treuÞ dryuen out and concludid and prouyd fro
and bi vertues of intellect risyng out of Þe Þing in itsilf which is to be leernyd,
or out of his circumstauncis, and not bi strengÞ of eny persoones
55 Book of feith I.1, pp. 124–7. 56 Folower I.11, p. 54.14–18.
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witnessyng’.57 An example of this might be knowing that a straight stick
placed in the water must remain straight, despite appearing bent, based on
our knowledge of how water distorts appearances of submerged objects. Here
we rely on nobody’s testimony, and only on our familiarity with the physical
phenomena involved. Likewise, opinion is more narrowly defined as likely
knowledge based on the object in question, without the testimony of others.
In his discussion in The book of feith, likely written after The folower, given its
frequent references to the discussion described here, Pecock is even less clear
in distinguishing the two species of faith. ‘Sciencial feiÞ’ is faith with a strong
likelihood of certainty, based on the extreme reliability of the authority
supporting it, while ‘opinyonal feiÞ’ has a likelihood relative to the general
reliability of the source supporting it.58 Regarding ‘opinyonal feiÞ’ he shifts
in sources of evidence from one’s own senses to the testimony of another in
The book of feith, confusing matters even more than they are already. This is
likely because he will argue that there is an important difference between the
interpretation of Scripture by well-educated clergy, which he implies is
‘ sciencial ’, expert evidence for faith, and the interpretation of Scripture by
the uneducated (Lollard) laity. The less educated awareness a reader brings
to Scripture, the less ‘ sciencial ’ and reliable the faith engendered, and the
more ‘opinional ’ and unreliable it will be.
Pecock’s conception of faith differs significantly from his scholastic
predecessors, who distinguished between infused and acquired faith; the
infused virtue of faith is a supernatural by-product of baptism, while acquired
faith arises from an inclination to believe the testimony of others.59 Pecock,
too, distinguishes between two kinds of faith in the Repressor, namely ‘worldli ’
and ‘goostli feith’. ‘Worldli feith’, or the belief in some truth without evi-
dence of the ‘doom of resoun’, is ‘bi assercioun or witnessing of man or
aungel not as messanger of God’, while ‘goostli feith ’ is the belief in the words
of God in Holy Scripture, or by virtue of standing practice in the church, ‘or
bi speche of God doon bi him silf, or bi his messanger withoute writing’.60
There is no explicit mention of the need for participation in sacraments, or
for grace, in Pecock’s description of ‘goostli feith’, although room for their
inclusion certainly is evident in the definition. Here, as in his discussion in The
folower, faith is a kind of knowing, not something separate from the
intellectual virtues.
57 Ibid. I.12, p. 64.8–12. 58 Book of feith I.3, pp. 140–4.
59 Aquinas describes faith as ‘ the habit of mind whereby eternal life is begun in us, making
the intellect assent to what is not apparent ’ (De veritate q.4, a.1), but classifies it as being
foremost among the theological virtues, and not among the intellectual virtues (Summa theologiae
IaIIae q.62, a.1–3). Scotus makes extensive use of the distinction between infused and acquired
faith in Quodlibetal quaestiones q.14, while Pecock says nothing of it in Folower, Repressor, The reule
or The book of feith. 60 Repressor ii.1, p. 133.
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Scripture’s authority and the authority of the Church
The ‘doom of feith’ is not a step a Christian ought to take in the same spirit
as Pecock thinks that the ‘doom of resoun’ warrants. This is especially
evident in The book of feith, where Pecock’s argument for the authority of
ecclesiastical guidance in the Christian’s faith life is most powerful. Our
natural means of assessing the merit of a proposition submitted for
acceptance on faith is not as wholly reliable as it is in assessing a ‘doom of
resoun’. The clergy, he reasons, ought to devote great effort to becoming
sufficiently educated in the logic, history and interpretative theory of
Scripture to serve Christians in facilitating the acceptance of the truths of
faith. Too frequently the Church exercises brute authority in doing this,
making it very likely that scholars will someday expose
The postis and the pilers of oure feith so unleernyd and nakid, for to meyntene and
defende our feith, that tho [the Church’s] adversaries, bi her greet evydencis to be
maad withynne the boondis of the kinde perteyniyng to feith, schulen perverte mych
multitude from feith, and scorn oure feith, and peradventure so it schal be in the
tyme of Anticrist to come, for defaute of sad and wel leerned divinis61
Pecock did just this in arguing that the Donation of Constantine was a
forgery in Repressor iii.14, which he had likely written five years previously.62
Likewise, the Church must never presume to deny syllogistically established
truths of reason, for its authority stops at justified ‘doom of resoun’ : ‘ If the
chirche in erthe determine azens it, what such a sillogisme concludith, we
schulen rather trowe and holde us to thilk sillogisme, than to the deter-
mynacioun of the chirche in erthe. ’63 Christian faith rests upon reason’s
decision to accept the authority of the Church in its interpretation of Holy
Scripture, and the Church must maintain its reliability by allowing for
reasonable inquiry into its methods. The inquirer is bound to make clear this
reasonableness to the Church in presenting the argument; merely holding
the critical inquiry to be valid from the inquirer’s standpoint is insufficient.64
The revealed truths that found the Christian faith were also the Church’s
foundation, and the two go together inextricably. To separate the one from
the other is as impossible as attempting to separate the form of the wall from
the stones and mortar that make it up. Pecock explains that the view that the
61 Book of feith I.2, p. 138.
62 Babbington dates Repressor to 1449, and Book of feith to 1456 in his introduction to Repressor
at pp. xx–xxxii. For Pecock’s arguments against the Donation see Repressor iii.14.359–67.
Brockwell suggests that Pecock’s arguments are all the more remarkable given his probable
lack of familiarity with the arguments of Valla and Nicholas of Cusa: Pecock and the Lancastrian
Church, 138–44. 63 Book of faith I.6, p. 175.
64 Ibid. I.8, pp. 195–7. To suppose one’s standpoint to be divinely inspired ‘ to know more of
Goddis privetees, being above the fynding and myzte of oure natural resoun, than he wole
vouche saaf forto reveele and denounce to us, is a foul stinking presumcioun’ : ibid. I.9, p. 219.
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people alone make up the Church, which had been Wyclif’s argument, is as
untenable as the view that the faith alone defines the Church:
Wherefore the chirche of God is maad, of the peple as of his material cause, and of
feith as of his formal cause; or at the least, the chirche is the seid peple, not as the seid
peple is in hem silf, but as, and hou, and while, and whanne, and where, the peple is
ioyned and coupled togider in oon feith tauzt from God.65
That the Christian faith is received from God by the Church as its formal
cause, and for the Church to function it must be fully aware of its divine
commission, either through scriptural authority, miraculous establishment or
apostolic succession.
Leaving aside miraculous establishment, which Pecock mentions only to
abandon it, the relation between the apostolic succession and scriptural
authority lies at the heart of his argument for the superiority of ecclesiastical
authority over that of the Bible.66 He notes that Lollards argue for the
absolute separation of church structure from scriptural authority, the rational
blindspot of an ‘obstinat and unobedient noumbre’. They reject the
leadership and structure of the Church on the grounds that it coerces the
multitude, holding that their own failure to reform it is at least a failure in
good faith. Were they to succeed, they would coerce believers into accepting
the splintered structure that they seem to admire. In so doing they
appropriate precisely the argument they purport to repudiate ; why should
Christians accept Lollard ecclesiology when the Lollards ultimately rely on
the same reasoning that they loudly reject as authoritarian?67
Past errors in the clergy’s interpretation of Scripture, which the Lollards
cite as reason for rejecting its authority, cannot support the Lollards’ case,
for the same reason that Pecock viewed the ‘argument from error ’ to be
untenable in Repressor i.14. God will not condemn the believer who puts trust
in errant clergy, even if the clergy intentionally spread heresy. If such a
trusting person is killed for defending what she believes to be true, she is
a martyr, her error notwithstanding. Since this is so, it follows that the clergy
are to be believed, and the authority of the Church respected, even in cases
where one suspects that the clergy may be in error.68 This shows the reason-
ing behind Pecock’s demand that the English Church reason with Lollards
rather than persecuting with prison and the stake ; their trust in erring Lollard
clergy shows their fundamentally Christian approach, and ought be regarded
as commendable, not contemptible. Should they remain recalcitrant in the
face of rational ecclesial instruction, then culpability lies in their putting
themselves before the better-educated clergy.
65 Ibid. I.5, p. 170.
66 Pecock advises against resort to miraculous occurrence as evidence to support an
argument based on the insufficiency of sure evidence for them: ibid. I.5, p. 170.
67 Ibid. I.9, pp. 212–13. 68 Ibid. I.10, pp. 222–5.
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‘But surely’, interjects the horrified Lollard, ‘Scripture is a more worthy
authority than any human contrivance?’ It is, Pecock responds, and its
authority is only comprehensible to the mind educated to plumb its depths,
past the literal sense too easily accepted by the uneducated. Without a
clerical class schooled in its intricacies, its awesome truths would be as
inscrutable to the average mind as is the complexities of the king’s law to non-
lawyers. Lollardy’s founder presented a similar argument ; Wyclif insisted
that one cannot comprehend Scripture’s truths without a solid foundation in
logic and philosophy of language: ‘And it is clear, that all error in knowledge
of holy scripture, and the reason why the amateur corrupts and falsifies
himself is from ignorance of grammar and logic ; unless God gives aid in
understanding of these rudiments of faith, the faith of scriptures will be very
weak-minded. ’ Pecock and Wyclif agree on the reader’s need for higher
education, but differ about Wyclif’s contention that grace is necessary to use
the education in scriptural interpretation. This is further exemplified in De
veritate sacrae scripturae, where Wyclif argues that ignorance of the grammar
and logic of Scripture dooms the reader to ignorance of its message, but later
argues that grace enables the informed lay reader (presumably a civil lord) to
correct clergy as necessary in their misinterpretation.69
After answering Lollard objections, Pecock formulates seven arguments to
establish the right ordering of ecclesiastical over scriptural authority. In the
interests of brevity, I will recount two, one grounded in the nature of
authority, and the other in church history. The first, presented as a simple
modus tollens, is this :
A: Nothing is called a foundation of faith which, when it is absent, does not
affect that faith.
B: One can imagine having faith sufficiently grounded to be salvific without
it being based in Scripture. (Pecock gives Exodus xiii.8–10 as an instance of
divinely commanded extra-scriptural instruction.)
Therefore, Scripture is not really a necessary ground for faith.70
The problematic premiss is B, the denial of the consequent, for its truth is
not a first principle of understanding. Pecock is aware of this, and earnestly
presents several different cases in which oral tradition precludes written
Scripture. Aside from the example from Exodus, he mentions other Old
69 Ibid. pp. 227–9. ‘Et patet, quod totus error in scripturae sacrae notitia, et quare idiotae
ipsam sic turpificant atque falsificant, est ex grammaticae et logicae ignorantia ; et nisi Deus
adjuverit ad ista rudimenta fidei cognoscenda, fides scripturae erit nimium parvipensa’ :
Trialogus i.8, in Johannis Wiclif Trialogus cum supplemento trialogi, ed. Gotthard Lechler, Oxford
1869, 64. See also John Wyclif, On the truth of holy Scripture, ed. and trans. Ian Levy, Kalamazoo
2001, 47–8, 306–11.
70 Book of feith II.1, pp. 237–9. The argument’s form is : If X is necessary for Y, then Y cannot
be without X. Y is possible without X, hence,y(X is necessary for Y).
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Testament cases of divine commands to pass on truths orally (Deuteronomy
vi.20–5; Joshua iv.8–24; Deuteronomy xi.18–21) as well as the monastic
practice of daily mealtime readings for spiritual edification. That each
instance of B except the last is scriptural might have been Pecock’s rhetorical
attempt to mollify Lollard sensibilities, but it does not contribute much to the
argument’s conclusion regarding the diminution of scriptural authority.
The second argument is historically based:
A: The Church on earth is always and everywhere the same, constant mystic
body.
B: In apostolic times, the Apostles were the Church.
B1: The effect Q of cause P is not so much the cause of a further effect R as is
P, the primary cause. (In this case, P is the Apostles, Q the New Testament,
produced by the Apostles, and R is the authority or foundation of the faith.)
Therefore, the clergy, the Apostles’ heirs, are more the foundation of the
Church than is Scripture.
This argument is somewhat better than the first, if only because its chief
premiss, B1, can be argued to be a first principle of understanding, while the
other two are definitive. Accept the two definitions, recognise B1 and the
conclusion appears to follow. What is missing, of course, is a premiss
establishing that the clergy are the Apostles’ only heirs ; Wyclif had argued
that the grace-favoured filled that role, and Lollards tended to proceed on
that assumption.71
Pecock’s aim in these arguments is not wholly to devalue Scripture as a
source of authority ; it is only to establish that one cannot rely on ‘doom of
feith’ as unquestionable foundation for scriptural interpretation. The import
of scriptural foundation is undeniable, as it is the only link we have to the
apostolic Church. But it does not follow that apostolic experience alone is
sufficient for the Christian faith. A thing that is a successive aggregate, like
the Church, can remain the same thing in signification and representation in
its acts, and in the authority of its jurisdiction, even with the constant change
in membership the aggregate experiences over time. If England had won a
war with France in the past, it does not follow that it must win a similar war
now, for its aggregate citizenry has changed, as has the citizenry of France.
Similarly, the written experiences of the Apostles for their Church will have a
different authoritative weight now that the Church’s membership has
changed. This does not mean that church leadership is given free rein to
override scriptural ordinances, but Pecock does advocate regular conciliar
discussion of the Church’s doctrine.72
Pecock’s desire was not to propound a new version of Aristotelian
rationalism in his vernacular works ; it was to use reasonable argument to
71 Ibid. II.1, pp. 245–6. 72 Ibid. II.4, pp. 274–82.
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douse the burning embers of Lollard heresy. Thus we cannot use this analysis
of his argument to lobby for his place in the pantheon of notable English
schoolmen, any more than we can argue for his being styled a proto-Hooker
simply because of a similarity in some of his ideas to what would later define
Anglicanism.73 I hope to have established here that Pecock’s idea of what
reason is, how faith is a species of it, and reason’s place in understanding the
truth of Scripture and the authority of the Church possesses a philosophical
coherence evocative of the spirit, if not the systematic consistency, of the
Aristotelian synthesists.
73 Peter Munz, The place of Hooker in the history of thought, London 1952, 41, rightly advises
against hasty attempts to emphasise similarity between the two, but he indulges in excessive
devaluation of the philosophical worth of Pecock’s thought.
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